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Our subject, whether the religion clauses of the federal constitu-
tion should be amended, goes to the heart of relations between gov-
ernment and the practice of religion in our society. These relations
deeply affect the health of both religion and government. When
public officials persecute some religions and embrace others, the
risks are political tyranny and rigid, unthinking, unfeeling, vapid re-
ligion. No one wishes that fate for us.
When most people ask whether the religion clauses should be
amended, they are really asking whether judicial interpretations have
become so misguided that Congress and state legislatures should in-
tervene and invoke the cumbersome process of constitutional
amendment. It could be otherwise. Someone might believe that the
fault lies with the Framers of the Bill of Rights, and that judges have
faithfully interpreted provisions that are intrinsically flawed.' But
* University Professor, Columbia University School of Law. This written
version maintains the flavor of the oral debate. It therefore contains less nu-
ance, qualification, and citation than one would expect in a scholarly article.
Some of the footnotes contain references to pieces in which I develop positions
in more depth. I have received very helpful comments from Clark Lombardi.
1. A person who believes judicial interpretation should be precisely ac-
cording to original understanding-whether the understanding of those who
adopted a provision or of reasonable readers of the provision-might suppose
that we need different relations between government and religion than were
conceived at the time when crucial constitutional language was adopted. There
is nothing illogical about such a position and it is apparently Robert George's
position regarding the Establishment Clause. However, one rarely sees this
position being taken, probably because the relevant original understanding is
so debatable in its application to modem problems that people manage to find
an intent that fits their views of desirable relations between government and
religion.
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people generally assume that the language of the religion clauses
sketches a set of relations between government and religion of which
they approve.
2
The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof .... According to settled judicial doctrine, the Four-
teenth Amendment makes the First Amendment applicable to the
states.4 Some critics object that the Establishment Clause should not
have been applied to the states. But by far the major concern about
the clauses regards the Supreme Court's interpretation of those
clauses. I shall concentrate on that.
I believe the present state of constitutional free exercise law is
very distressing. The prevailing approach is insensitive to religious
exercise, is effectively indifferent to the plight of religious minori-
ties, and sends a deeply disturbing message about the central charac-
ter of our country. My sense of Establishment Clause law is more
complicated. For over two decades, the Court was guided by a three-
fold test of purpose, effect, and entanglement, highlighted by a prin-
ciple of no substantial aid to religious institutions.5 To oversimplify
somewhat, the Court is moving away from that approach, towards a
guiding norm of neutrality, under which religious and nonreligious
institutions should be treated similarly. The key elements of the ap-
proach which the Court may be abandoning deserve the Court's con-
tinued support.
You might suppose from what I have just said that my views
about amendment follow easily: the Free Exercise Clause should be
amended and, if establishment interpretations get much worse, that
clause should also be amended. However, that is not my opinion.
2. However, some people believe that the Establishment Clause sets up a
regime of nonestablishment for the federal government that is too strict for the
states. These critics usually conclude that the Establishment Clause should not
have been held applicable to the states.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. The standard account is that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause effects this "incorporation." Some scholars, myself included, believe
that greater emphasis should be placed on the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and, with respect to religious classifications-and some other classifi-
cations-the Equal Protection Clause.
5. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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Constitutional amendment is radical surgery. The Bill of Rights has
never been amended.6 Its symbolic strength is tied to its constancy.7
Constitutional amendment should not be undertaken unless the Court
has become mired in deep injustice, and judicial and legislative relief
both appear hopeless for an intermediate future. The Supreme Court
is not yet close to such injustice in its treatment of the Establishment
Clause. Current controlling doctrine regarding free exercise is unjust
enough to warrant amendment, but legislative and judicial means of
correction have not yet been exhausted.
II. FREE EXERCISE: THE BALEFUL IMPLICATIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
DIVISION v SMITH
The critical question in free exercise law is simple: do religious
people have any right of free exercise not to comply with neutral
laws of general application? From 1963 to 1990 the Supreme
Court's answer was a powerful "yes"; in 1990 it became a resound-
ing "no," with two equivocal and confusing qualifications.
8
The case most strongly illustrating a right not to comply with
neutral laws was resolved in 1972. The Court had to decide whether
Amish parents could withdraw their children from ordinary schools
after eighth grade, despite a state law that required children to stay in
school until the age of sixteen.9 The Justices decided unanimously
that the state law had to give way.10 The Court found that vocational
training within the Amish community and a rejection of secular
learning were indissolubly linked to the Amish faith." Because
6. However, one might count the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
as overriding the Supreme Court's treatment of slaves as Fifth Amendment
property in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
7. Furthermore, as one who approves of most major Bill of Rights deci-
sions in the last half century, many of which were initially highly unpopular, I
would be loathe to see amendment become a quick fix for controversial results.
8. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82, 884-85 (1990).
9. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
10. See id. at 234. Justice Douglas disagreed with the rest of the Court over
whether the parents could be taken to represent the children's wishes; but as to
the parents whose child indicated that she agreed with her parents' views,
Douglas joined the result. Douglas also took a different view from the major-
ity about other prospective claimants less religious and less law-abiding than
the Amish. See id. at 241-49 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
11. See id. at 222-23.
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fundamental religious freedoms were at stake, Wisconsin could not
require ordinary schooling beyond eighth grade unless it had a com-
pelling interest in doing so.12 Although the State presented strong
arguments that further education was necessary to prepare students
for intelligent citizenship and for career opportunities, these argu-
ments were not deemed strong enough. 13 The Court determined that
state law had to yield to the Amish right to practice their religion.
14
The Amish case stands in stark contrast with Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith. 15 The factual and procedural nuances of the case were
complicated, but the question the Court addressed in 1990 was
whether an Oregon law prohibiting the use of peyote could be ap-
plied against members of the Native American Church who ingested
peyote in worship services. The California Supreme Court said the
following about the Native American Church a quarter century ear-
lier:
Peyote ... plays a central role in the ceremony and
practice of the Native American Church .... [T]he theol-
ogy of the church combines certain Christian teachings with
the belief that peyote embodies the Holy Spirit and that
those who partake of peyote enter into direct contact with
God.
The "meeting," a ceremony marked by the sacramental
use of peyote, composes the cornerstone of the peyote re-
ligion.
Although peyote serves as a sacramental symbol simi-
lar to bread and wine in certain Christian churches, it is
more than a sacrament. Peyote constitutes in itself an ob-
ject of worship; prayers are directed to it much as prayers
are devoted to the Holy Ghost. On the other hand, to use
peyote for nonreligious purposes is sacrilegious. Members
of the church regard peyote also as a "teacher" because it
12. See id. at 221.
13. See id. at234.
14. See id.
15. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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induces a feeling of brotherhood with other members; in-
deed, it enables the participant to experience the Deity.
16
Nothing in Smith suggests that this picture is inaccurate. Yet the
Court not only denied the religious claim, it rejected outright the ap-
plication of the compelling interest test or any other balancing test.'
7
If a legal prohibition 18 does not discriminate among religions and is
not directed against a religion, a court has finished its job. Courts
need not, they cannot, get into the kind of assessment the Supreme
Court undertook in the Yoder case. 19 Those with religious claims
must comply like everyone else. Notice, we are not talking here
about religious claims to engage in morally favored alternatives, such
as conscientious objection to military service; we are talking about
the very center of worship services.
You will quickly recognize that what is all right for the Native
American Church has to be all right for other religious groups, in-
cluding the Roman Catholic Church. Imagine that a state allows
counties to prohibit the sale and use of alcohol. A small county hap-
pens to be populated overwhelmingly by Protestants who use grape
juice for communion and have a realistic sense of the terrible effects
alcohol has wrought on human welfare. The county legislature bans
the sale and use of all alcoholic beverages, making no exception for
sacramental use in communion, despite the presence of four Catholic
churches in the county. You might have presumed that the privilege
to use wine during Mass is at the core of what the Free Exercise
Clause protects. After Smith, you would be wrong. You might ask
whether the law discriminates against Roman Catholics. A genuine
wish to stem the use of alcohol as much as possible would not dis-
criminate. One response might be that no one with the least empathy
for Roman Catholicism would pass such a law. The answer provided
16. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 720-21, 394 P.2d 813, 817-18, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69, 73-4 (1964).
17. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-86.
18. Some language in the opinion refers to criminal laws, but nothing sug-
gests that prohibitions with noncriminal consequences should be treated differ-
ently. I assume that the rule established in Smith applies to both civil and
criminal prohibitions.
19. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-19 (1972) (balancing the State's interest
against the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbring-
ing of their children).
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by Smith is that the signs of discrimination must be publicly evident,
not guessed at by judges. Moreover, the Court apparently believes
that insensitivity does not amount to discrimination.
2°
If restrictions on the use of wine in communion seem a remote
possibility, a legislative ban on gender discrimination in all employ-
ment may be less remote.21 I do not believe there are decisive
reasons to limit the priesthood to males, and I have a sister who is a
dedicated and effective minister. Nevertheless, I do not believe the
state should be telling religious groups what standards they should
have for creating clergy. Under Smith, the state can do just that if its
law is general.
What led the Court to its conclusion in Smith? The majority
opinion claims support from prior Supreme Court decisions.22 No
one doubts that the opinion puts aside the most recent authoritative
formulations of controlling standards. Judicial opinions are often
less than candid in the way in which they line up earlier decisions.
Smith pushes the limits of accepted judicial practice in its ingenious
marshaling of preceding cases.
You might think that the Court would not reach such a harsh re-
sult-against the grain of earlier cases-unless it felt compelled to do
so by the language of the Constitution itself. Some Justices in the
majority may have held this view,23 but the opinion asserts nothing of
20. See generally, Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects
of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 343-45
(1995) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Quo Vadis] (discussing the possibility that in-
difference and inattention might amount to a constitutional violation). I am
more sympathetic to this approach than the Supreme Court appears to be.
21. One might think that criteria for clergy falls into a "hybrid" category-
raising free association as well as religious exercise claims-which I shall dis-
cuss shortly. See infra pp. 16-16. However, it is difficult to understand why
hiring criteria for clergy count as a matter of free association, while use of a
substance such as peyote as the center of associational life does not. One
might also argue against the application of a ban on gender discrimination
when training and hiring clergy if, for example, a religious group views
women as incapable of performing tasks essential to the salvation of parishion-
ers, making women critically different from men for fulfilling the role of a
priest.
22. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1879)).
23. Because individual Justices often compromise over language in order to
build an opinion that will win the support of a majority, the positions expressed
[Vol. 32:9
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the sort. It does not say that the language of the Free Exercise Clause
requires the result. The Justices contend only that their decision
gives the text about not prohibiting free exercise a "permissible
reading," that they do not think the words must be taken to give re-
ligious claimants privileges against ordinary legal prohibitions.24 For
a decision that reverses twenty-seven years of constitutional law, this
degree of reliance on text and original understanding is incredibly
weak.
One need not look far to see the underlying reasons for the re-
versal. If courts are to grant constitutional privileges to religious
claimants, they have to be ready to decide whether the claimants are
sincere, whether the claims are religious, whether the interference
with religious exercise is substantial, and whether the government
has a strong interest in applying a law uniformly against religious
claimants as well as others. These can be daunting inquiries which
the Court does not think judges should have to undertake. The Court
wants clear, more reliable standards of decision than the compelling
interest test, as that test has been applied to claims for privileges
based on religion.25 The Court is not opposed to exceptions for re-
ligious claimants, but the creation of these exceptions must be left to
legislatures, not to courts employing amorphous standards that yield
arbitrary decisions. The last sentence of the opinion in Smith is re-
markably candid:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the po-
litical process will place at a relative disadvantage those re-
ligious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that un-
avoidable consequence of democratic government must be
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto
in an opinion are not always a sure guide to what each Justice believes.
24. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
25. The "compelling interest test," as applied to claims for exemption from
valid laws, has never been as difficult a hurdle for the government to overcome
as the stringent compelling interest test courts typically apply in equal protec-
tion and free speech contexts. Because a claimant's victory in the free exercise
exemption cases means carving out an exception to laws that are themselves
appropriate, the courts have justifiably lowered the government's burden. See
generally Greenawalt, Quo Vadis, supra note 20, at 330-33.
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itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.26
I have mentioned that the Court does qualify the Smith decision
in two ways.27 First, it leaves standing a line of cases holding that
unemployment compensation may not be denied to people because
they refuse to work on Saturday, if their reason for refusing to work
is religious conviction.28 The opinion does not indicate clearly just
how far the principle of these cases extends.
Second, the Court discusses hybrid cases in which free exercise
claims link to other constitutional claims.29 The hybrid discussion
seems jerry-built to take care of the Yoder case, in which parental
rights were linked to religious claims.30 I have yet to meet someone
who thinks all of the hybrid discussion in Smith makes sense. 31 In
some hybrid cases, other constitutional claims are sufficient by them-
selves. Most cases in which free speech and free exercise claims
overlap are of this variety. In these cases any free exercise arguments
are superfluous. According to the Court, free exercise arguments
could matter in another class of cases--cases in which neither the
free exercise claim nor the other claim is sufficient by itself, but to-
gether they carry the day. I do not quarrel with the possible existence
of such cases; but if free exercise claims, in combination with other
claims, can put some parties over the top, it is nonsensical to suppose
that they can never be sufficient alone. How can free exercise claims
always be too weak by themselves if they are sometimes strong
enough to win in combination with other claims? To imagine that a
particular kind of claim can only succeed when bolstered by another
claim is conceptually incoherent.
26. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
27. See supra text accompanying note 18.
28. The initial case in this line was Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
29. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
30. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1971).
31. One might suppose that all five Justices in the Smith majority think it
makes sense, but because the language may be designed to take care of Yoder,
and because it may be the product of compromise, it is uncertain how many of
the Justices think a principled defense can be made of the position taken in
Smith.
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One further point needs to be made about the Court's qualifica-
tions to its basic approach. The very inquiries about sincerity, relig-
ion, substantiality of interference with religious practice, and strength
of government interest, to which the Court objects so strenuously, are
necessary to assess whether particular religious claims of exemption
in the unemployment compensation and hybrid categories should re-
ceive constitutional protection.
Setting these dubious qualifications aside, we come to the dis-
concerting conclusion that the Supreme Court has nearly written the
Free Exercise Clause out of the Constitution. The Clause continues
to figure in cases involving religious belief and speech,32 religious
discrimination, 3 and disputes over church doctrine.34 However, the
Free Exercise Clause no longer has any real effect on the outcome.
The Free Speech Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal
Protection Clause would probably produce the same results without a
Free Exercise Clause.35 Any doctrine that so eviscerates a funda-
mental constitutional right is certainly suspect.
The difficulties of adjudication that worry the Court so much are
indeed formidable, but the Court's choice to abandon minority relig-
ions to possibly inhospitable legislatures is much more troubling.
Some important constitutional cases have a striking effect on the
lives of many people.36 Other important cases matter more for what
they symbolize. The Smith case has great symbolic significance. It
symbolizes judicial rigidity, extreme majoritarianism, and lack of
concern for the religious rights of minorities.
Yet I do not favor an amendment to rectify Smith at this stage.
37
In June 1997, the Court struck down the Religious Freedom
32. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-06 (1940).
33. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 520
U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
34. See Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969).
35. The presence of a Free Exercise Clause over history has affected how
these other clauses, especially the Equal Protection Clause, have been under-
stood in their application to religion. I do not deny that the Clause has been
relevant in that way.
36. Among these are Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not the Time for Constitu-
tional Amendment: The Limited Reach of City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. &
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Restoration Act, adopted virtually unanimously by Congress, which
was designed to reinstate the pre-Smith approach to free exercise.38
The Court stated that Congress lacked power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to adopt such a law against states and localities.39 How-
ever, nothing the Court said precludes such federal legislation as it
applies to federal laws and executive acts.40 Nor does the decision
preclude similar legislation within states. Furthermore, states can use
the compelling interest standard to interpret free exercise provisions
in their own constitutions. As long as these avenues are open to
undo the practical effects of Smith, it is too early to urge a constitu-
tional amendment to accord religious believers the privilege that
Smith denies them.
Il. THE DISQUIETING MARCH TOWARD NEUTRALITY IN
ESTABLISHMENT LAW
The status of establishment law is harder to describe than that of
free exercise, and my disquiet is more ambivalent. Since 1947, when
the Supreme Court first applied the Establishment Clause to state and
local government, its decisions have been what I would call moder-
ately separationist. Separationist in emphasizing the desirability of
keeping government and religion apart, and moderate in refusing to
push that principle to the limits of its logic. In that first case, Ever-
son v. Board of Education,41 the Court embraced Jefferson's phrase
that the Establishment Clause requires "a wall of separation between
church and State." 2 However, the majority held that public payment
for the bus transportation of parochial school students did not violate
that requirement.43 Subse uently, the Court has upheld property tax
exemptions for churches, various fringe assistance to parochial
MARY L. REv. 689 (1998) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not the Time]
(asserting that a more preferable alternative to constitutional amendment is ef-
fective statutory relief).
38. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
39. See id. at 2172.
40. Some of the language in the opinion reads as though the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is invalid in all its applications. See id. at 2160; see,
e.g., Greenawalt, Why Now Is Not the Time, supra note 37, at 692.
41. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
42. Id. at 16.
43. See id. at 18.
44. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
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schools, 45 more substantial aid to religious colleges,46 and salaries for
chaplains employed by state legislatures.47 However, the Court has
held that prayers and devotional bible reading as classroom exercises
in public schools,48 and prayer as part of a graduation 
ceremony, 49
are not acceptable. Most importantly, the Court has blocked sub-
stantial direct aid to parochial schools.
Since 1971 the Court's main doctrinal standard for establish-
ment cases has been the threefold test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.
50 Un-
der the Lemon test, a law or government practice is invalid if it lacks
a secular purpose, has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting re-
ligion, or unduly entangles government with religion.51 Dissenting
justices and many scholars have ridiculed the Lemon test and by now
seven sitting Justices have either urged its outright rejection or have
proposed that courts approach establishment cases without any single
overarching standard.52
In certain types of cases the Court's majority has already adopted
a different approach, one that may be viewed as a substitute for, or
variation of, the purpose and effect aspects of Lemon. Under this ap-
proach, known as the "endorsement test,"53 a court asks if a display
of religious symbols endorses a particular religion, sending an im-
permissible "message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community .... 54
One of the most important cases dealing with the Establishment
Clause in recent years is Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the
45. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
46. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971).
47. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793-94 (1983).
48. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that daily reci-
tation of prayer in public schools is "wholly inconsistent with the Establish-
ment Clause"); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
205 (1963) (state law requiring school day to begin with Bible readings was
deemed unconstitutional).
49. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
50. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
51. See id.
52. See Greenawalt, Quo Vadis, supra note 20, at 359-61.
53. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
763 (1995); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989).
54. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
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University of Virginia,55 which was decided in 1995. The University
of Virginia had funded various student publications but had refused
to finance the printing of Wide Awake, an evangelical Christian jour-
nal.56 The students who were publishing the journal complained that
they were being discriminated against because of their religious point
of view.57 The University argued that giving public money to a jour-
nal devoted largely to proselytizing would constitute government
support of religion.58 The Supreme Court held that singling out a
journal because of its religious message constituted viewpoint dis-
crimination. 59 Such discrimination violated the Free Speech Clause
of the First Amendment unless the discrimination could be justified
to avoid establishing religion. 60 The Court stated that providing
money for one religious publication among many student journals
would not be an establishment of religion; therefore Wide Awake was
entitled to be funded.61
The Justices rightly saw the case as involving a clash between a
principle of "no support" and a principle of "neutrality," under which
the government acts appropriately if it does not classify on the basis
of religion.62 Members of the majority attempted to make the hold-
ing of the case as narrow as possible, stressing that money for the
journal came from student fees, not general taxes, and that the funds
went to the outside printer, not the religious publication itself.63 The
dissenters emphasized that Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, a crucial document in the church-
state history of Virginia and the country, had opposed any use of
taxes for religious purposes. 64 In response, Justice Thomas argued
that Madison objected only to religion being singled out and that
55. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
56. See id. at 827.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 838.
59. See id. at 845; see, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From Olympus,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 698 (1996) (suggesting that in most of its coverage,
the guideline did not constitute viewpoint discrimination).
60. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 837.
61. See id. at 843-46.
62. See id. at 839-41.
63. See id. at 840-44.
64. See id. at 868-71 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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neither Madison's views nor the Establishment Clause bar public
money going to religious institutions so long as eligibility does not
turn on their religious character.
65
Shifting from this drastically curtailed and oversimplified ac-
count of present Establishment Clause law, I now sketch my views of
that law: (1) nonestablishment is a vital bulwark of religious liberty
and religious vitality, as well as a shield against religious conflict; (2)
the standards of the Lemon test are much sounder than they are gen-
erally thought to be; and (3) it would be a misfortune if neutrality
was to swallow up the principle of no support.
I believe in nonestablishment; not everybody does. In various
forms one hears the following sentiments expressed:
Religious liberty is wonderful and no one should be coerced
into religious practice, but government aid to religion is
fine, and it would be a good thing if religious institutions
had more influence on government in this increasingly ma-
terialistic, selfish, and permissive age. Neither the United
States nor individual states should have an official church
like the Church of England, nor should they announce par-
ticular religious doctrines as those of the government, but
that is about as far as nonestablishment should go.
Some critics claim that nondiscriminatory support of branches of
the Christian religion is permissible because the Framers accepted
this type of government support. Others acknowledge that the gov-
ernment should treat all religions similarly, but may assist them all.
Some critics portray those who favor strong separation of church
and state as secularists who would like to undermine what they arro-
gantly regard as foolish superstition. However, many people who
care deeply about religion also favor separation. I count myself
within that category. I believe that religion is most vital when it is
not intertwined with government. Social explanations are always
complex and controversial, but a look at religion in Western Europe
should cause any advocate of support to pause. In country after
country with an official church, or at least substantial support given
to various churches and religious schools, religious involvement has
65. See id. at 854-58 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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declined to a level far below that in the United States. 66 Religion
thrives as much as it does in the United States partly because it does
not have the state's imprimatur.
The fact that government support of religion is unhealthy does
not itself reveal what should be enforced by courts and what should
be left to legislatures. An opponent of separationist judicial deci-
sions might concede that official support of religion is undesirable,
but contend that under our Constitution these matters should be de-
cided by political representatives. This is not the occasion for me to
defend judicial involvement against various arguments in favor of
judicial passivity. However, if the courts do not defer to legislation
that impinges on other constitutional rights, there is no persuasive
basis for their doing so when the Establishment Clause is at issue.
What of the threefold test of Lemon as a set of constitutional
standards? 67 Critics generally concede that some forms of aid to re-
ligion do violate the Establishment Clause, but dissenting justices
and others have taken strong exception to the purpose and entangle-
ment components of the Lemon test. With regard to purpose, if leg-
islation is not otherwise objectionable, the fact that it is adopted with
bad motives is said to be irrelevant. In my opinion, the real issue is
how judges determine which purposes underlie laws. For example, a
moment of silence to start the day in public schools is constitution-
ally permissible. 68 Suppose a state legislature mandates a moment of
silence and states in the statutory preamble: "In order to encourage
Christian prayer and promote participation in the Christian religion,
but having been restrained by misguided judicial decisions prohibit-
ing Christian prayers spoken by teachers, we hereby adopt this mo-
ment of silence." Such an outright statutory endorsement of Chris-
tian prayer should be declared unconstitutional. In such instances,
forbidden purposes can be fatal to a law.
My view of entanglement is similar. If official positions are as-
signed by law to members of particular religions, or the government
begins to review the merits of choices of clerics by religious
66. See Americans are Churchgoers, SOC'Y, July 17, 1998, at 2.
67. See Greenawalt, Quo Vadis, supra note 20, at 361-69.
68. One can discern this from a careful reading of all the opinions in
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
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groups, 69 the state and religious institutions have become impermis-
sibly intertwined. Whatever may be the best conceptualization, some
involvements between church and government are too great. The se-
rious argument is over which entanglements are too excessive to be
constitutionally permitted.
The Lemon test need not be retained as an all-purpose standard
for every establishment case. Perhaps developing more individual-
ized approaches to various types of problems would be wiser. How-
ever, I strongly believe that the fundamental elements of purpose,
effect, and entanglement represent sound insights about nonestab-
lishment.
70
This brings us to the fundamental issue of "no support" versus
"neutrality," which needs a little more clarification. Few people are
proposing to support religious groups with public funds solely be-
cause the groups are religious. Even if the rationale is that religion is
good for civic life, the state cannot single out religion for financial
support. The proponents of neutrality take one of two positions. The
more sweeping position-apparently urged by Justice Thomas-is
summed up as follows: So long as the government does not classify
groups according to religion, it may aid religious groups in the same
way it would aid any other group. 71 Suppose the government decides
that private associations are vital for civic life. Based on this view,
government grants are provided to all private associations with active
memberships, including religious bodies, with each group permitted
to spend with active memberships its money as it pleases. It turns
out that about half of the associations to benefit are religious. Under
such a scheme, tax money would go directly to churches, syna-
gogues, and other religious institutions where much of it would be
spent for religious purposes. Such a plan would be "neutral," but the
69. Such review would be a problem if any law required nondiscriminatory
hiring of clergy. How would an agency or court decide whether a church's
claim of nondiscriminatory choice was valid? Ordinary resumes do not reveal
whether someone has the right "spiritual" qualifications.
70. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using
Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781 (1998) (drawing on these elements in analyzing kosher
and get laws).
71. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 861.
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use of tax money to promote religious efforts is contrary to our con-
stitutional tradition and should be considered unacceptable.
The more modest position insists that the religious groups that
receive financial support do so because they provide a specific secu-
lar benefit, such as medical care, adoption services, or schooling.
Public money would go for the provision of these benefits. Indeed, a
great deal of money currently goes to religious institutions that run
hospitals and welfare assistance programs, as well as providing other
services. Thus far, the Supreme Court has drawn the line at parochial
schools, stating that substantial assistance to them would impermis-
sibly aid the religious efforts of the schools. Many Roman Catholics,
among others, have regarded these decisions as harsh and perhaps
even a denial of their right to send their children to religious schools.
A full blown "neutrality" approach would wipe away these decisions,
allowing aid to be given to religious schools up to the secular benefit
of the schooling they provide. Among other things, this approach
would validate voucher plans geared towards increasing parental
choice, even when the plans include religious schools and most of
the schools benefitted are in fact religious.
My late wife Sanja and I sent our three children to a religious
school for all, or almost all, of their schooling. Our last son had to
leave after tenth grade because the high school was closed, largely
due to financial reasons. One of the two children in my new family
attends a Catholic school. I am sympathetic to religious education
and its financial exigencies, but I continue to believe that significant
state support is unwise. Citizens should not be taxed to promote re-
ligion, even when selection of beneficiaries is neutral. Programs of
support will inevitably inject religious groups in a politically divisive
scramble for funds, and in the long run, reliance on the government
may undermine the special quality of religious schools. Thus, I am
troubled by the prospect of a march from "no support" to "neutral-
ity."
The changes in Supreme Court doctrine that may take place in
the near future would be unfortunate, but they do not presage the sort
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of grave injustice that would warrant amendment of the Establish-




In summary, I am concerned about the movement in the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause, but I do
not think the developments which concern me should lead to formal
amendment. At present, my view is the same about the Free Exercise
Clause. Here, I believe the principle that the Court has rejected is
important enough to justify an amendment, but that principle may
still be saved by legislatures and by state courts' interpretations of
state constitutions.
72. Another strategic reason not to seek an amendment is that adoption of
an explicitly strict separationist approach would not be very likely.
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